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We analyze the growth and welfare effects of globalization in a dynamic Schumpeterian 
North-South product-cycle model. Economic growth is driven by R&D activities of Northern 
entrepreneurs. Top Northern production technologies are imitated by the South. In the North, 
there is wage bargaining between a labor union and firms, and a minimum wage rate exists. 
Unilateral Northern trade liberalization reduces the rate of innovation, increases Northern 
unemployment, and reduces both Northern and Southern per-capita welfare. The effects are 
reversed in the case of unilateral Southern trade liberalization. Hence, wage bargaining above 
a given minimum wage promotes mercantilist behavior of developed countries. 
JEL-Code: F12, F43, J51, O31, O32. 







Department of Economics 





Department of Economics 
Union College 
Schenectady 






This version: 11th December 2009 
This is a significantly revised version of the paper “Labor Unions, Globalization and 
Endogenous Growth” that was presented at the May 2008 CESifo-Delphi conference on 
“Governments, Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance” in Munich. We thank the 
participants for helpful comments and discussion. Part of this work was done while Wolf-
Heimo Grieben was a visiting scholar at the Economics Department of Columbia University, 
New York, and Stockholm School of Economics. We thank them for their hospitality. This 
work was supported by a grant from the Ministry of Science, Research and the Arts of Baden-
Württemberg, Germany (Az: 21-655.042-5-2/1) to Wolf-Heimo Grieben.  
 
2
1  Introduction 
The period since the 1980s has been marked by a significant surge in “globalization” as evidenced by the 
substantial increase in the trade to GDP ratios of many countries across the globe, most notably those of 
large developing countries (such as China and India). It is commonly held that the current wave of global-
ization has been driven by the massive declines in existing trade barriers and communication costs, along 
with opening up of some countries to trade and investment flows for the first time.
1 During this recent 
wave of globalization, the labor unions’ impact on the labor markets of developed countries has remained 
surprisingly robust and persistent, especially in Continental European countries. Although the unionization 
rates have shown a downward trend since the 1980s for most OECD countries, the coverage of collective 
bargaining has remained relatively stable around or above 70% for most Continental European Countries 
(Nickell 2003, pp. 21-22, Nickell et al. 2005, pp. 6-7). Notably, the coordination of union wage bargain-
ing, which captures the extent to which the negotiating parties take into account the possible negative em-
ployment effects of the bargained wage rate, has decreased in most OECD countries (see Nickell 2003, p. 
22, and Ortigueira 2008). 
There is a vast theoretical trade literature that studies the impact of various aspects of globalization on 
labor markets with unions.
2 Surprisingly, however, almost all of the papers in this literature use static 
models without incorporating economic growth and dynamic trade patterns.
3 In the meanwhile, the litera-
ture on growth and labor unions has been confined to closed-economy settings (e.g., Lingens, 2003, and 
Palokangas 1996, 2004). Hence, the question of how trade liberalization affects growth, employment and 
welfare in a setting with a unionized labor market remains open to investigation. 
In this paper we tackle with this question by constructing a dynamic North-South trade model with 
union wage bargaining and R&D driven Schumpeterian growth. We examine the impact of globalization 
                                                 
1  See Wacziarg and Welch (2008) for evidence on the integration of large and previously closed economies with the 
global economy. See Tang (2006, Figures 2 and 3) for evidence on the decline in transport and communication 
costs. See Grieben and Şener (2009, Table 1) for evidence on falling tariff rates across the globe. Rodrik (1994) 
provides evidence on a significant wave of unilateral trade liberalization of many developing countries since the 
early 1980s.
 
2  This literature includes, but is not restricted to, Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Huizinga (1993), Driffill and van 
der Ploeg (1995), Zhao (1995, 1998, 2001), Naylor (1998, 1999), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Gaston (2002), 
Egger and Egger (2003), Skaksen (2004), Andersen (2005), Andersen and Skaksen (2007), Lommerud et al. 
(2009), and Eckel and Egger (2009). 
3  The only paper we are aware of which analyzes the impact of a certain facet of globalization on the union effects 
on growth and employment is by Palokangas (2005). He uses a symmetric multi-country framework, where coun-
tries are connected by technology spillovers (but with no trade in goods). Palokangas studies the effects of global-
ization by considering an increase in cross-country technology spillovers.  
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on bargained wages, employment, innovation, and long-run welfare, where the latter two are ignored by 
most of the existing macroeconomic literature on labor unions.
4 
In our model the world economy consists of a continuum of industries. Northern entrepreneurs par-
ticipate in industry-specific R&D races to innovate higher quality products. Successful innovators manu-
facture their top quality products using Northern labor and become global monopolists. Over time, North-
ern technologies can be imitated in the South where production costs are lower. With each Southern imita-
tion success, industry production shifts from the North to the South. Further Northern innovation moves 
the corresponding industry back to the North. Consequently, the North exports newly-invented goods, and 
the South exports imitated products (“product-cycle trade”).
5 The governments in both regions impose ad-
valorem tariffs on imported products. Trade is balanced in equilibrium. We remove the scale effects on 
innovation by introducing R&D difficulty, the level of which is determined endogenously by the Rent 
Protection Activities (RPAs) of Northern producers. In the North, a centralized Northern labor union bar-
gains with Northern firms over the wage rate of Northern production workers.
6 The objective of the labor 
union is to maximize the expected excess wage income over a given minimum wage set by the govern-
ment.
7 The union will bargain for a wage rate that is higher than the competitive wage level and this leads 
to unemployment. 
                                                 
4  More generally, an extensive body of literature has emerged investigating the globalization effects on labor mar-
kets, partly also using a dynamic growth framework. One focus in this literature has been on wage inequality 
and/or unemployment, and distinguishing the impact of globalization from that of various forms of biased techno-
logical change (Davis 1998b, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999, Arnold 2002, Ethier 2005, Grieben 2005, Moore 
and Ranjan 2005, and Şener 2001, 2006). Other papers focus on whether the effects of labor market rigidities in 
one country spill over to other countries (Davis 1998a, Meckl 2006, Alessandria and Delacroix 2008, Helpman 
and Itskhoki 2009). The growth and employment consequences of changes in labor market institutions in two-
country models with Schumpeterian growth have been studied in Grieben (2004) and Şener (2006), while Grieben 
(2009) investigates the globalization effects in a North-South Schumpeterian growth model at various degrees of 
Northern labor market rigidities. 
5 Different versions of product-cycle trade have recently been proposed: in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2009), 
product cycles are one-way only from North to South, where manufacturing of imitated products never moves 
back to the North. In Şener and Zhao (2009), the Northern stage of production is skipped altogether for some 
products, such that Northern newly invented goods are immediately produced in the South only (“iPod cycle”). 
6  This is the main distinguishing feature relative to the baseline setting of our companion paper Grieben and Şener 
(2009), where wage rates are determined competitively. In that paper, we considered two variations of the institu-
tional set-up for RPAs and an extension with a low-tech Southern sector that does not have technological progress. 
We found that tariffs do not matter for steady-state innovation and growth (“tariff-neutrality” result) in all settings, 
except for the case with a Southern low-tech sector. 
7  Minimum wages “are applied in more than 90 per cent of ILO member states” (ILO 2008, p. 34) and are becom-
ing a more prevalent feature of the labor markets in developed countries recently, where, according to ILO (2008, 
p. 36, Table 2), the average annual increase of minimum wages in real terms within the period 2001 – 2007 was 
3.8 %. It turns out that the existence of a positive minimum wage rate is crucial for our main results.  
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In our comparative-static analysis, we concentrate on changes in three different globalization parame-
ters: the Southern imitation rate, the relative size of the Southern population which captures the presence 
of the South in the world trade markets, and import tariffs. In addition, we investigate the effects of 
changes in three Northern labor market policy parameters: the union’s bargaining power, the minimum 
wage rate, and employment-protection costs for Northern firms. 
We find that an increased Southern presence in the world economy increases Northern innovation 
and thus worldwide growth, and decreases Northern unemployment. The same results are obtained for 
unilateral Southern trade liberalization. However, the opposite results (declining growth and rising unem-
ployment) follow from increased Southern imitation and unilateral Northern trade liberalization. A higher 
union bargaining power, an increase in the minimum-wage rate, or an increase in employment-protection 
costs for Northern firms reduce Northern innovation and increase Northern unemployment. 
Our welfare analysis implies that for any given Southern import tariff rate it is optimal for the North-
ern policy maker to choose the highest Northern import tariff rate feasible. Moreover, the benefits of 
Northern protectionism in terms of both Northern and Southern per-capita welfare are increasing in the 
level of Northern labor market rigidities. In the meanwhile, for any given Northern tariff rate, it is optimal 
for the Southern policy maker to choose the lowest Southern tariff rate feasible. Moreover, the benefits of 
Southern trade liberalization in terms of both Northern and Southern per-capita welfare are also increasing 
in the level of Northern labor market rigidities. We establish these results analytically for Northern wel-
fare and numerically for Southern welfare. In a cooperative equilibrium aimed at maximizing global wel-
fare, we find that the policy decisions remain the same: the North chooses the highest feasible tariff rate 
and the South chooses the lowest feasible tariff rate. 
It follows that our model provides an explanation for the apparent mercantilism at the WTO negotia-
tions of Northern developed countries (i.e., to favor trade liberalization of Southern trade partner coun-
tries, but to oppose own tariff reductions) with persistent labor market rigidities. We note that our argu-
ments rely on the dynamic welfare gains implied by the resulting increase in the Northern steady-state 
innovation rate, a point which has been ignored in the static literature. Furthermore, our explanation does 
not hinge on a terms-of-trade effect, a mechanism that has been emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999) but heavily criticized by Ethier (2004, 2007). 
In our companion paper Grieben and Şener (2009) with perfectly flexible labor markets in both the 
North and South, we find that tariffs are neutral on Northern innovation and growth. In the current setting, 
where we allow for rigidities in the Northern labor market and keep the Southern labor market flexible, we 
find that higher Northern tariffs raise the innovation rate whereas higher Southern tariffs reduce it. Taken  
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together, the results of these two papers uncover the role of labor market institutions in determining the 
long-term growth effects of unilateral trade liberalization in Schumpeterian models, which has been large-
ly neglected in the existing literature. We should note however that both in Grieben and Şener (2009) and 
in this paper, bilateral trade liberalization raises long-run growth. Hence, this finding appears to be a ro-
bust outcome of these Schumpeterian settings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model, derives the 
steady-state equilibrium, analyzes its properties including welfare results, and provides a numerical simu-
lation of our model. Section 3 compares our main results with related literature. Section 4 concludes. 
2  The Basic Model 
2.1  Household Behavior 
The world economy consists of two countries, the North and the South, indexed by i ∈ {N, S}, respec-
tively. Each country has a fixed number of identical households, normalized to one. Let N0i denote the 
population size and also the labor force size of country i at time zero. The number of household members 
in both countries grows at the common rate n > 0; thus, the population size in country i at time t equals Nti 
= N0ie
nt. 
The representative household maximizes the utility function 
  ()
() () 0 0 log
nt
ii i F tN e f t d t
ρ ∞ −− =∫
 
   for  i = N, S, (1) 
where ρ > n is the subjective discount rate. The function log fi(t) stands for the instantaneous logarithmic 
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   for  i = N, S, (2) 
where λ > 1 is the size of each quality improvement, j(ω,t) is the number of successful innovations in in-
dustry ω ∈ [0,1] up to time t, and xi(j,ω,t) is the per-capita demand for a product of quality j in industry ω 
at time t.  Hence, as in the standard quality-ladder models, product quality starts at λ
0 = 1 in any industry ω 
and improves at discrete steps with each successful innovation, which is governed by a stochastic process.  
The household optimization process consists of two steps. The first step is to allocate consumption 
expenditure across products to maximize fi(t) for given product prices. Since products in a typical industry 
ω differ only in their quality, and λ units of quality j are a perfect substitute for one unit of quality j + 1,  
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households purchase in each industry only the product with the lowest quality-adjusted price. In addition, 
since products enter (2) symmetrically, each household spreads its consumption expenditure evenly across 
product lines. It thus follows that per-capita demand for each industry’s product is xi(ω,t) = ci(t)/p(t) where 
ci is per-capita consumption expenditure in country i, and p(t) is the price of the purchased good. 
Given the static demand functions, the second step is to determine the consumption expenditure path 
over time. This involves maximizing 
  () () 0 0 log
nt
ii N ec t d t
ρ ∞ −− ∫
 
   for  i = N, S, (3) 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
  () () () () ( ) ( ) ii i i i FAt W It rtF At ctNt =+ −   ,
 
(4) 
where FAi(t) denotes the stock of financial assets owned by the household, WIi(t) is the household’s ex-
pected wage income and r(t) is the instantaneous rate of return in the global market. The expected wage 
component WIi(t) accounts for unemployment which will arise for Northern workers. The solution to this 
dynamic optimization problem gives the familiar Euler equation (“Keynes-Ramsey rule”) 










 for  i = N, S. (5) 
At the steady-state equilibrium, ci will be constant; thus r(t) = ρ. Since we focus on steady-states and con-
sider structurally-identical industries, we henceforth drop the time index t and the industry index ω. 
2.2  Labor and Activities 
Labor is the only factor of production and is immobile across countries. In the North, the labor force con-
sists of specialized and general-purpose workers, with the fixed proportion of the former given as sN ∈ (0, 
1) and that of the latter given as 1−sN. In the North, there are three types of activities: innovation, manu-
facturing of final goods, and rent protection. General-purpose workers can be employed in innovation or 
goods production, whereas specialized workers (lawyers, lobbyists) are only employed in Rent Protection 
Activities (RPAs), the activities that are undertaken by incumbent firms to deter the innovation efforts 
targeted at their products.
8 In the South, there is only one type of labor used in manufacturing of final 
                                                 
8  RPAs are first introduced in a closed economy endogenous growth setting by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007). 
Grieben and Şener (2009) discuss the empirical evidence on RPAs in a North-South context. Our labor assignment 
follows Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Grieben and Şener (2009). As is discussed in the latter paper, its 
advantage is that it yields fully-endogenous growth (in the sense that the steady-state growth rate depends on all  
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goods which is the only type of activity (Appendix R.1, which is available upon request, extends the mod-
el for endogenous imitation of Northern state-of-the-art products as a second type of activity of Southern 
labor). 
2.3  Product Markets 
The world economy consists of a continuum of structurally-identical industries indexed by ω ∈ [0,1]. In 
each industry, Northern entrepreneurs participate in R&D races to discover the technology of producing 
next-generation products, whose quality is λ > 1 times higher than the current-generation product. When-
ever a higher quality product is discovered in the North, a new R&D race starts and the technology of 
producing the previous-generation product becomes common knowledge to all firms in the global econ-
omy. In the global product markets, firms engage in Bertrand price competition to offer the lowest quality-
adjusted price given their state of technology and regional labor costs. In the North, workers are repre-
sented by a labor union and wages are determined by decentralized wage bargaining. In the South, com-
petitive labor market conditions apply. We normalize the Southern wage rate to 1 and denote the Northern 
wage rate of general-purpose labor as wL ∈ ]1, λ[. In both countries, production of one unit of final goods 
requires one unit of general-purpose labor, regardless of the quality level of the manufactured goods. The 
governments of both regions impose ad-valorem tariffs on imported goods. We denote by τN ≥ 0 the tariff 
rate imposed by the North and by τS ≥ 0 the tariff rate imposed by the South. 
For each industry, there are two possible structures at any point in time. Whenever a Northern entre-
preneur discovers a next-generation product, the resulting structure is a Northern industry, in which the 
Northern quality leader competes with Southern followers who have access to the previous-generation 
technology. Whenever the technology of producing a current-generation product leaks to the South, all 
Southern firms gain access to the current-generation technology. The resulting structure is a Southern 
industry, in which the Northern quality leader competes with Southern followers.
9  
Consider first the profits of firms in a Northern industry. In the Northern market, the Southern fol-
lowers face an ad-valorem tariff rate τN . By pricing at marginal cost and accounting for the Northern tariff 
rate, the followers can offer their goods to Northern consumers at a price 1+τN. In this case, the Northern 
                                                                                                                                                              
parameters of the model) with a parsimonious structure by creating a link between the innovation rate and the 
Northern wage rate for specialized relative to general-purpose workers in the simplest possible way. 
9  Northern followers’ unit cost is wL whereas the Southern followers’ unit cost is 1. Northern followers cannot com-
pete with Southern followers in the Southern market if wL(1+τN) > 1. This condition holds automatically given that 
wL > 1 at the steady-state. Moreover, Northern followers cannot compete with Southern followers in the Northern 
market provided wL > 1+τN, which we impose.  
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quality leader charges the limit price 
N
N p  = λ(1+τN) − ε with ε → 0 and drives the Southern followers out 
of the market. The profits of the Northern quality leader from sales in the Northern market are: 
  [( 1 ) ] 1
(1 ) (1 )
N NN L
NN L N N
NN
cN w
wc N πλ τ
λτ λτ
⎡ ⎤
=+ − = − ⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣ ⎦
.  
In the Southern market, the Northern quality leader faces an ad-valorem tariff rate τS. Under marginal 
cost pricing, the Southern followers can offer a price of 1. To capture the Southern market, the Northern 
quality leader must set its price such that the price faced by the Southern consumers does not exceed λ. 
This implies that the Northern leader charges the limit price 
S
N p = λ − ε with ε → 0, of which the Northern 
firm receives only λ/(1+τS).
































=+= − + − ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
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. (6) 
Consider now the profits of firms in a Southern industry. In the Southern market, the Southern fol-
lowers can charge  1
S
S p =  and price out the Northern quality leader who can offer a price of wL(1+τS) > 1 
by charging at marginal cost. In the Northern market, the Southern followers can offer an after-tariff prod-
uct price of  1
N
SN p τ =+ . Under the restriction that wL > 1+τN, which we maintain, the Northern quality 
leader who can offer its product at wL is again priced out. Consequently, in Southern industries only 
Southern firms prevail by charging marginal cost and they earn zero profits. Hence, in Southern industries, 
Bertrand pricing with many firms effectively replicates the perfectly competitive outcome.
11 
                                                 
10 It immediately follows that Northern quality leaders cannot benefit from export taxes: for any export price exceed-
ing λ, Southern consumers would switch to local goods although these are of inferior quality. This implication will 
be important when we later argue that this model is able to explain actual mercantilist behavior of Northern coun-
tries at WTO trade rounds, which includes the observation that export taxes are not used to improve terms of trade. 
11 This is in accord with the modeling in, e.g., Glass (2004), Sayek and Şener (2006), and Şener and Zhao (2009). As 
is well known from standard textbooks in trade theory, the Southern government has no incentive to offer export 
subsidies to its competitive exporting industries, given that WTO rules allow the Northern government to react by  
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While Northern quality leaders earn monopoly profits, they simultaneously expend resources for 
RPAs, i.e. to safeguard their monopoly positions against their Northern rivals (e.g., by investing in trade 
secrecy, patent enforcement through litigation, lobbying the government to influence intellectual property 
legislation and etc.). For this purpose, each Northern incumbent hires Northern specialized labor at a wage 
rate of wH. The cost of performing X(t) units of RPAs is  H wX γ , where γ  is the unit labor requirement of 
such activities. Hence, a Northern incumbent’s profit flow net of rent protection costs then equals: 
 
P
NNH wX π πγ =− .   (7) 
2.4  Technology of Innovation and Optimal Innovation Decision 
In the North, there are sequential and stochastic R&D races in each industry ω ∈ [0,1] to discover the 
next-generation product. The R&D technology is identical across Northern firms. The instantaneous prob-
ability of innovation success (the Poisson arrival rate) by firm j is given as 
  with jj N ID DnX ι δ ==   , (8) 
where Ij represents the innovation intensity of a typical Northern entrepreneur j targeting industry ω, and 
D measures the difficulty of conducting R&D in industry ω at time t. According to (8), R&D difficulty D 
is modeled as a stock variable, where nN is the proportion of industries located in the North, X is the flow 
of RPAs undertaken by the Northern incumbent in industry ω at time t, and δ measures the effectiveness 
of these RPAs. The equation of motion for D in (8) implies that whenever an industry is registered as a 
Northern industry – the probability of which is equal to nN in equilibrium – Northern incumbents under-
take RPAs which increase the stock of R&D difficulty in that industry by δX. For a constant steady-state 
innovation rate, R&D difficulty must grow at the same rate as the labor force, hence D nD =    is required. 
From this and (8), we obtain the steady-state stock of R&D difficulty: 
  N DnX n δ = .   (9) 
Since innovation success is independently distributed across firms and industries, the Poisson arrival rate 
for innovation at the industry level (which is ‘the’ Northern innovation rate) equals 
  with j j
jj
ID I I ιι == = ∑∑ . (10) 
                                                                                                                                                              
imposing countervailing duties, thereby effectively collecting the Southern export subsidies while leaving con-
sumers and producers in both countries unaffected. Again, this implication will be important when we later use 
this model to explain actual mercantilist behavior of Northern countries at WTO trade rounds, which includes the 
observation that countervailing-duty laws exist.  
 
10
Entrepreneurs participating in R&D races hire general-purpose labor to perform R&D. The cost of 
conducting Ij units of R&D activity is wL(1−σι)aι Ij, where σι is a public R&D subsidy rate (financed by 
lump-sum taxation for simplicity), and aι is the unit labor requirement of R&D. Imposing the usual free-
entry assumption for R&D races, expected profits from R&D are competed away, and the maximization 
problem 






dt w a I dt
D
ιι σ −−  
yields 
  ( ) 1 NL vw a D ιι σ =− ,   (11) 
where vN is the firm value of a successful Northern innovator. 
2.5  The Stock Market 
The savings of consumers are channeled to firms investing in R&D by means of a global stock market. 
Over a small time period dt, the stockholders of a Northern quality leader operating in a Northern industry 
receive dividend payments πNdt. With probability (ι + μ)dt, successful innovation or imitation takes place 
and the Northern firm is driven out of the market. The stockholders face the risk of a complete capital loss 
of size vN. When shutting down, the firm has to pay liquidation costs proportional to its valuation BvN, 
where 0 < B < 1. With probability 1 − (ι + μ)dt, neither Northern innovation nor Southern imitation takes 
place, and the firm experiences a capital gain  N v   dt. Consumers can engage in complete diversification of 
their asset portfolio to eliminate the industry-specific risk of unsuccessful R&D efforts, hence in an arbi-
trage-free asset market equilibrium, the expected return from a stock issued by the Northern firm must 
equal the return of a risk-free asset that pays the market interest rate on an investment of equal size during 
the same time period: 
  ( )( ) ( ) 11 NN N N dt v B dt v dt dt rv dt πι μ ι μ −+++ ⎡ − +⎤ = ⎣⎦   . (12) 
Solving (12) for vN and imposing dt → 0 yields 
 









++ + −  
   (13) 
as the appropriately discounted monopoly profits determining the value of an incumbent firm.  
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2.6  Optimal Rent Protection Decision by Northern Incumbents 
Substituting D from (9) into (10), we derive  ( ) N X In n X ι δ = , which clearly shows that an increase in 
RPAs X diminishes the threat of replacement faced by the incumbent as it reduces ι. The incumbent 
avoids the capital loss vN and realizes the change in its valuation  N v    by the extent of the decline in ι per 
unit of time. In the meanwhile each unit of RPA costs wHγ per unit of time. When choosing the optimal 
level of X, the Northern incumbent weighs the marginal gains against the marginal costs. Formally, the 
firm chooses X to maximize the expected returns on its stocks 
  ( ) ( )() () () () { } 11
P
NH N N w X dt v X X dt v dt X X Bd t πγ ιμ ιμ −−⎡ + ⎤ + − ⎡ + ⎦ +⎤ ⎣ ⎣⎦   , 
where (7) is used for πN and the expression for ι(X) is from above. Setting the derivative of the expected 
return with respect to X to zero, using dι (X
 )/dX = −ι /X < 0, and taking limits as dt → 0, we derive the first 
order condition for the optimal X as: 
  ( ) ( ) 1 NH Xv Bw ι γ =+ .   (14) 
Intuitively, the optimal level of RPAs X increases with the firm value vN (since there is more at stake) and 
the replacement rate due to innovation ι (the instantaneous probability of full capital loss at each point in 
time), and it decreases with the unit cost of RPAs wHγ. Finally, X increases with liquidation costs B, hence 
equation (14) formalizes the notion that the presence of liquidation costs encourages incumbents to make 
an extra effort to prolong their monopoly power by raising the level of RPAs. 





















++ + −  
. (15) 
2.7  Balanced Trade 
We impose a balance-of-trade (BOT) condition to determine the relative consumer expenditure levels for 
both countries. More specifically, the BOT implies that the value of exports net of tariffs must be equal 
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where the LHS (RHS) denotes the value of Northern (Southern) exports net of tariffs. To determine nN, the 
industry share located in the North, we note that Northern entrepreneurs capture industry leadership from 
Southern firms at a rate of ι(1−nN), while Southern firms capture industry leadership from Northern firms 
at a rate of µnN. Constancy of industry shares in the steady state requires ι(1−nN) = µnN, which implies 





 .    (16) 
By using (16) and defining the relative Southern population size as ηS ≡ NS/NN, the above BOT condi-
tion can be rewritten as 















where cR ≡ cN/cS denotes the relative North-South consumption expenditure. We note the following rela-
tionships for future use: 
•  cR is increasing in ι/μ = nN/nS: an increase in the relative proportion of Northern industries nN/nS 
raises the relative size of Northern exports, thereby increasing the relative Northern income avail-
able for consumption; 
•  cR is increasing in τN: a lower Northern import tariff τN reduces the prices of Southern exports in 
the Northern market, thereby increasing the amount of Southern exports and relative Southern in-
come available for consumption; 
•  cR is decreasing in τS: a lower Southern import tariff τS increases the Northern firms’ profit mar-
gins net of tariffs, thereby increasing Northern export revenues and relative Northern income 
available for consumption; 
•  cR is increasing in ηS: a larger relative size of the Southern market raises the relative export reve-
nues of the North, thereby increasing relative Northern income available for consumption. 
2.8  Labor Markets 1: Equilibrium Conditions 
To close our model, we derive the labor market equilibria for both countries. In the North, decentralized 
wage bargaining can lead to trade-union induced unemployment. The general-purpose labor market equi-
librium requires that (1−sN−u)NN = LN is always fulfilled, where u ≡ U/NN denotes the Northern unem-
ployment rate, U is the total number of Northern unemployed workers, and LN is Northern employment.  
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The Northern demand for manufacturing labor is nN{cNNN/[(1+τN)λ]+cSNS/λ}, the Northern R&D la-
bor demand is, using (10), aιI = aιιD; hence the Northern general-purpose labor market equilibrium condi-
tion is 
  () 1
1
NN N
NS S N N
N
nc N
Lc N a D s u N ιι
λτ
⎛⎞
=+ + = − − ⎜⎟
+ ⎝⎠
. (18) 
Obviously, the Northern bargained wage rate wL does not (directly) affect Northern production labor de-
mand. The reason is that due to global Bertrand price competition, product prices are proportional to the 
marginal cost of the lowest-cost producers, which happen to be the Southern producers with marginal cost 
wS ≡ 1. 
Northern RPA labor demand is  N nX γ , hence the Northern specialized labor market equilibrium con-
dition is 
  NN N nXs N γ = .   (19) 
The Southern demand for manufacturing labor is (1−nN)[cSNS + cNNN/(1+τN)]. Given that Southern im-
itation does not require any resources, the Southern labor market (SLM) equilibrium condition is 











   SLM. (20) 
2.9  Labor Markets 2: Wage Bargaining in the North 
There is decentralized wage bargaining between any new incumbent Northern firm and a centralized labor 
union who bargains on behalf of Northern general-purpose workers. The sequence of events is as follows. 
First, when an entrepreneur firm enters the R&D race, it employs general-purpose workers at the going 
wage rate wL to perform R&D services. There is nothing to bargain between entrepreneurs and R&D 
workers due to free entry in R&D races and thus zero expected profits. Second, if the entrepreneur be-
comes successful in innovating, it has to bargain with the production workers before any production starts. 
This is because there are positive expected monopoly profits and workers are represented by a labor union. 
In the meanwhile, the previously employed R&D workers of the successful innovator can find employ-
ment (either in a new R&D firm or in a producing firm which may as well be the successful innovator) or 
they can become unemployed (if the bargained wage rate exceeds the competitive wage rate). When bar-
gaining, the prospective production workers take the industry-wide innovation rate as given since it is  
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beyond control of a single firm.
12 Third, after the wage bargaining is settled, the firm decides about the 
level of manufacturing employment and starts production.
13 The bargained wage rate, although deter-
mined individually between a single firm and the labor union, will be the same across all firms because 
they face a symmetric problem and have identical bargaining power. 











α − ⎛⎞ Ω= − − → ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (21) 
α ∈ [0,1[ is the relative bargaining power of the labor union, and WN ≡ (wL − w
min)
θ[(1 − sN − u)NN]
χ is the 
expected excess-wage income received by the union members, where excess wage and employment levels 
are evaluated by the elasticities of the underlying utility function of the labor union, respectively.
14 The 
minimum wage rate w
min > 1 is set by the government, and we assume that w
min is credibly enforced by 
law such that it serves as the natural reference point for the labor union.
15  N W  is the workers’ discounted 
per-period income during the negotiations on wL or during a strike – their ‘inside option’ (and not what 
they would get if they unilaterally quit the negotiations without agreement – their ‘outside option’
16), and 
                                                 
12 The same is true with respect to the economy-wide unemployment rate which will be derived as a function of the 
aggregate innovation rate. The individual firm’s innovation rate is also exogenous to the bargaining process since 
for producing firms, the innovation is a past event and it no longer invests in R&D in this industry. This is the 
standard Arrow inertia effect. 
13 Since the Northern firms’ production labor demand (18) does not (directly) depend on wL, there is no pass-through 
of higher Northern production costs to product prices, which would reduce consumption and hence the individual 
Northern firm’s general-purpose labor demand. Thus, in our setting it does not matter whether the firm is granted 
the “right to manage” employment ex-post or ex-ante wage bargaining. 
14 The underlying labor union’s objective is a Stone-Geary type utility function U(wL, LN) = (wL − w
min)
θLN
χ, where θ 
≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0 represent, respectively, the union’s preference for excess wages and employment, cf. Mezzetti and 
Dinopoulos (1991, p. 82).  
15 Lingens (2003) takes as the union’s reference wage the competitive wage rate derived from a hypothetical situa-
tion with no wage bargaining. This requires truly heroic rationality of labor unions since the competitive wage rate 
cannot be observed in such a setting, while the minimum wage rate can be observed (by looking into the text of 
law) even without actually being paid to anybody. In the trade literature with unions (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 
1991, Zhao 1998, 2001), the union’s reference wage is derived from a second sector that is perfectly competitive 
and non-unionized. This modeling renders the reference wage a real and observable option but complicates the 
analysis and removes unemployment from the model. Palokangas (1996, 2004, 2005) neglects such a reference 
point altogether, which has the downside that for α = 0, the bargained wage rate becomes zero. 
16 Palokangas (2004, p. 205, fn. 6), with reference to Binmore at al. (1986, p. 186-187), points out that taking the 
expected income outside the firm as the union’s reference point would not be correct since it “[…] is not in line 
with the microfoundations of the alternating offers game”. Instead, it is “[…] appropriate to identify the reference 
income with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute”. The outside option for the 
workers (unemployment benefits, wage income elsewhere) if the firm and the labor union fail to agree on a wage 
rate is an irrelevant alternative and “[…] has no effect on the bargain, provided the bargain gives both parties  
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N v  is the discounted Northern firm’s profits during the negotiation or a strike. We assume that employed 
workers do not have any income during wage negotiations (i.e., we abstract from any strike funds of the 
labor union). Moreover, possible one-time redundancy payments to those workers just laid off do not mat-
ter in this respect since they are not paid under the condition that the bargaining process takes another 
period, hence  N W = 0. Similarly,  N v  = 0 since Northern firms cannot manufacture without agreement on 
wL. Using these identities in (21), and substituting for vN from (15) simplifies the bargaining problem to 
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, (23) 
which implies that the increase in the firm’s profits extraction by the labor union through a marginal in-
crease in wL − w
min, evaluated by the union’s share α in Ω and the union’s excess wage preference θ 
(LHS), must equal the increase in the firms’ production costs by this marginal increase in wL − w
min, eva-
luated by the firm’s share 1−α in Ω (RHS).
17 For the remainder of the paper, we normalize θ ≡ 1 without 
loss of generality. By using the BOT condition (17) in (23) and simplifying terms, we find the negotiated 
Northern unskilled wage rate as 
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max is the maximum wage rate that would apply for α → 1, which leaves zero profits for Northern 
incumbent firms and thus would destroy any innovation incentives of entrepreneurs. For the rest of the 
paper we maintain w
max > wL > w
min to study the impact of bargaining on employment and growth in a 
meaningful way. 
Obviously, the bargained wage rate wL is increasing in the labor union’s bargaining power α and the 
fallback value w
min. To explain the remaining properties of wL in (24), we rewrite (23) with θ ≡ 1 as fol-
                                                                                                                                                              
more than they could get elsewhere” (Layard et al. 2005, p. 100). See also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, p. 389), or 
Hall and Milgrom (2008) on this argument. 
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where  R  ≡  cNNN+cSNS/(1+τS) denotes the total sales revenues per Northern industry, and Q  ≡ 
cNNN/[λ(1+τN)]+cSNS/λ denotes the total quantity produced per Northern industry. It follows that R/Q is 
the average revenue received by Northern firms on both markets. Obviously, wL is increasing in R/Q be-
cause a higher average revenue expands the size of the pie over which firms and workers bargain. Using 


























A decrease in τN has three effects on the Northern bargained wage rate wL. The first two are triggered 
by the reduction in the relative North-South expenditure cR, which follows from the BOT condition (17). 
First, a lower cR implies a reduction in Northern total sales revenues relative to Southern consumption 
expenditure R/(cSNS), which reduces the average revenue R/Q received by Northern firms and hence wL. 
Second, a lower cR implies a reduction in Northern total quantity produced relative to Southern consump-
tion expenditure Q/(cSNS), which raises the average revenue R/Q received by Northern firms and hence wL. 
The third effect is triggered by the direct impact of Northern tariffs on prices. A lower τN reduces the price 
charged in the Northern market and thus raises the total quantity sold relative to cSNS. This reduces the 
average revenue R/Q received by Northern firms and hence wL. As can immediately be seen from the re-
duced form (24), the first and third effects dominate the second, and the net effect is a decrease in wL. 
Hence, with wage bargaining, our model establishes a positive link between Northern import tariffs and 
Northern general-purpose wages, ceteris paribus. A decrease in τS simply reverses all three effects and 
thus increases wL. 
An increase in the Northern innovation rate ι raises cR, which raises both revenues R/(cSNS) and pro-
duction quantity Q/(cSNS) relative to Southern consumption expenditure. For positive tariff rates, the reve-
nue effect dominates the quantity effect, and hence wL increases with higher ι. The reasoning for why wL 
declines with higher μ is analogous. We summarize our results in 
Lemma 1: The bargained wage rate wL is increasing in α, w
min, τN, and ι; it is decreasing in 
τS and μ.  
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2.10  Steady-State Equilibrium 
We solve the model for an interior steady-state equilibrium where the endogenous variables cN, cS, u ∈ (0, 
1), ι, nN, wL and wH are non-negative and remain constant. πN(t),  ( )
N
N t π ,  ( )
S
N t π , X(t), D(t) and vN(t) are 
also non-negative and grow at a common rate of n, and r = ρ. 
We first derive reduced-form expressions for cN and cS by using (16) and the BOT condition (17) in 
the Southern labor market clearing condition (20). This yields 













 ,    (25) 
which is unambiguously increasing in ι, ηS and τN, and decreasing in μ and τS. Also, we find 













 ,    (26) 
which is unambiguously increasing in ι and τS, and decreasing in μ.
18 
To explain the properties of (25) and (26), we plot the BOT condition (17) and the SLM condition 
(20) in (cN, cS) space in Figure 1. The BOT curve is upward sloping, capturing the cR ≡ cN/cS ratio implied 
by balanced trade for given ι. The SLM curve is downward sloping, capturing the trade-off between cN 
and cS in the context of Southern resource equilibrium for a given level of ι. 
A lower Northern tariff rate τN leads to a decrease in cR, turning the BOT curve clockwise. The in-
creased demand for Southern exports triggered by the lower τN boosts labor demand in the South. Restor-
ing equilibrium requires a fall in cN for given cS, which turns the SLM curve counterclockwise around the 
abscissa intercept 1/nS. Clearly, the net effect is that cN goes down, and it follows from (26) that the effects 
on cS exactly cancel out such that cS remains constant. 
A lower Southern tariff rate τS increases cR, turning the BOT curve counterclockwise. Southern tariffs 
have no influence on the SLM condition. Thus, the net effects are that cS declines and cN increases. 
                                                 
18 Note that with free trade, cS = wS = 1. Hence the BOT condition is equivalent to “balanced asset ownership”: 
Northern people hold only assets of Northern firms and Southern people hold only assets of Southern firms. Since 
there is perfect competition in Southern imitation-based products, the value of Southern firms and thus the value of 
Southern assets is equal to zero.  
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An increase in the relative size of the Southern market ηS raises cR, turning the BOT curve counterclock-
wise. A higher ηS also implies a relative expansion of Southern resources. For a given cS, this allows for 
an increase in cN and turns the SLM curve clockwise around the abscissa intercept 1/nS. Obviously, the net 
effect is that cN increases, and it follows from (26) that the effects on cS exactly cancel out such that cS 
remains constant. 
A higher Southern imitation rate μ leads to a decrease in cR, turning the BOT curve clockwise. As the 
share of Southern industries nS increase with the higher μ, the demand for Southern labor increases. For a 
given cS, restoring the Southern labor market equilibrium requires a lower cN. Hence, the SLM curves 
shifts down. As a result, cN decreases, and it follows from (26) that the net effect on cS is negative as well. 
Finally, a higher innovation rate ι triggers the exact opposite forces and thereby leads to higher levels of 
both cN and cS.  
Now we can reduce the Northern general-purpose labor market clearing condition (18) to an equation 
in only two endogenous variables, ι and u. Using (16) to substitute for nN, (17) to substitute for cS, (25) to 
substitute for cN, (9) to substitute for D and (19) to substitute for X, gives, after simplifying, the Northern 
steady-state unemployment rate u
* as a decreasing function of the innovation rate: 
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where  ( ) N Aa s n ιι δ γ ≡  captures the effective resource requirement per unit of R&D (so that ιAι is the 
per-capita R&D labor demand). Since we impose wL > w
comp (to be validated by our later numerical simu-
lation), it follows u
* > 0 ∀ α ∈ ]0, 1].
19 
Next, we substitute vN from (11) into (14) and use (9) to substitute for D. This gives the Northern 
specialized-labor wage rate as an increasing function of wL and ι: 
  ( ) ()
2 11 H LN ww A B s ιι σι =− + .   (28) 
To determine the steady-state innovation rate ι
*, we set (15) equal to (11), use (17) to substitute for cS, 
(25) to substitute for cN, (24) to substitute for wL, (9) to substitute for D, (19) to substitute for X, and use 
the steady-state results r = ρ and  NN vv   = n. This yields the free-entry in innovation (FEIN) condition as 
an implicit function that pins down ι
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. 
The LHS of (29) gives the discounted R&D benefit divided by wL, and the RHS of (29) gives R&D 
costs divided by wL. As is demonstrated in Appendix A, the signs indicated below (29) follow from im-
plicit differentiation under sufficiently low tariff rates
20 if, and only if, 
  () 1 nB ρ μ −< +    (30) 
is fulfilled. This turns out to be the condition for stability of equilibrium
21 and thus will be maintained for 
the rest of this paper. 
                                                 
19 The competitive wage rate w
comp is the wage rate that clears the labor market under no bargaining. Any higher 
bargained wage rate wL > w
comp (which justifies the existence of a trade union) raises R&D and production costs 
without increasing revenues of successful entrepreneurs, which unambiguously reduces R&D incentives. The re-
sulting decrease in ι reduces R&D and production labor demand (the latter by reducing the share of Northern in-
dustries, inter alia) in the North, which implies u
* > 0 in equilibrium. 
20 This restriction means that we are able to formally establish this result for τN = τS = 0, but obviously it holds for a 
full range of tariff rates, although the exact boundaries cannot be determined. 
21 Technically, this assumption – as well as the assumption of sufficiently low tariff rates – is necessary to ensure that 
the implicit function f(ι
*,…) = 0 derived from (29) is monotonously decreasing in ι
*. Intuitively, an increase in ι 
must reduce the profitability of innovative R&D expenditure in order to yield a stable solution for ι. Thus, the sig- 
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The remaining endogenous variables are determined recursively for given ι
* in the following order. u
* 
follows from (27), wL
* follows from (24), nN
* follows from (16), cN
* and cS
* follow from (25) and (26), νN
* 
follows from (15), 
P
N π
∗  follows from (6), wH
* follows from (28), X
* follows from (14), and D
* follows 
from  (9). Finally, the common steady-state utility growth rate is derived as usual from (2) as g
* = 
NN f f  
SS f f =   = ι
*logλ. 
The properties of the steady-state innovation and unemployment rates are very intuitive. A decrease 
in the minimum wage rate w
min raises ι
*. A lower minimum wage rate worsens the effective bargaining 
power of the union, and thereby leads to a lower Northern wage rate wL. This reduces both R&D and pro-
duction costs, and thus increases ι
*. For the same reason, ι
* is decreasing in the bargaining power α of the 
labor union. A larger liquidation cost B reduces ι
* via two channels: first, it reduces vN in (13) by increas-
ing the capital loss of the firm when imitation or further innovation take place. Second, incumbent firms 
react to a larger B by increasing their RPA expenditure in (14), which leads to a further decline in vN. 
A decrease in the Northern import tariff τN exerts multiple effects on R&D profitability. First, it 
forces the Northern incumbent to reduce its markup in the domestic market, lowering the profit flows πN. 
This is reinforced by the reduction in cN which is triggered by the fall in τN. With profit sharing in place, 
the firm can pass on the lower profits to workers in the form of a lower bargained wage rate wL (Lemma 
1). This works to mitigate the fall in πN by reducing both R&D and production costs. Provided that wL 
contains an exogenous component like w
min (to be discussed in more detail further below), the net impact 
is a reduction in R&D profitability and thus a lower Northern import tariff τN leads to a lower ι
*. 
A decrease in the Southern import tariff τS can be analyzed similarly. A lower τS
 increases πN by in-
creasing the after-tariff price enjoyed by the Northern incumbent in the Southern market and also by trig-
gering an increase in cN. This is mitigated by a higher bargained wage rate wL and lower cS. Again, pro-
vided that wL contains an exogenous component like w
min, the net impact is an increase in R&D incentives, 
and thus a lower Southern import tariff τS leads to a higher ι
*.
22 
An increase in the Southern imitation rate μ has several effects on ι
*. It raises the replacement rate 
and thereby reduces the rewards from innovating vN in (13). This effect is further strengthened by the re-
                                                                                                                                                              
nificance of condition (30) is to ensure, together with (A.6) and (A.7) from Appendix A, the existence and unique-
ness of the steady-state equilibrium in the neighborhood of free trade.  
22 Appendix R.2 (available upon request) shows that bilateral trade liberalization has an ambiguous effect on ι
*. 
However, our numerical simulation in section 2.12 suggests that for reasonable parameter values, the net impact of 




ductions in both cN and cS, which decrease πN. The firm passes the decline in its profit flows to workers 
and bargains for a lower wage rate wL (Lemma 1). However, this does not dominate the negative effects 
and the net profitability of R&D declines. Consequently, a higher Southern imitation rate μ decreases ι
*. 
An increase in the relative size of the Southern economy ηS increases cN and hence generates larger profits 
from domestic sales in the North. This increases innovation incentives and thus ι
*.
23 
We now briefly discuss those determinants of the steady-state unemployment rate u
* given in (27) 
which are of main interest. First, a decrease in the labor union’s bargaining power α or the minimum wage 
rate w
min unambiguously reduces u
* by increasing ι
*. A higher ι
* raises production employment by increas-
ing the proportion of Northern industries nN and the levels of per-capita consumption expenditure, cN and 
cS. These effects work to boost the demand for Northern labor in manufacturing. In addition, the higher 
R&D intensity ι
*directly raises R&D labor demand. There is no union impact on u
* other than through 
raising ι
* since the bargained wage rate does not affect Northern supply prices. Second, an increase in 
liquidation costs B raises u
* by reducing ι
*. Third, Northern (Southern) unilateral trade liberalization τN ↓ 
(τS ↓) increases (decreases) Northern unemployment by reducing (raising) ι
*.
24 Fourth, an increase in the 
Southern imitation rate μ raises u
* since it reduces the proportion of Northern industries nN both directly 
and indirectly, by decreasing ι
*. This unemployment-generating effect is reinforced by the decline in cN 
and cS triggered by the higher μ. Fifth, an increase in ηS reduces u
* directly by expanding the Southern 
consumption expenditure per unit of Northern labor cSηS, and indirectly by increasing cN and ι
*. Summa-
rizing the main arguments, we have derived our
25 
                                                 
23 A higher ηS captures the increased Southern presence in the world trading system and is thus considered as one 
form of globalization (see Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 2007, and Lu 2007). In our companion paper with flexible 
labor markets, Grieben and Şener (2009), we found the same results as in here: a higher ηS raises ι
*. However, 
when we differentiated between innovation-deterring and imitation-deterring activities as Northern-resource-using 
and Southern-resource-using activities, respectively, we found that a higher ηS can actually lower the rates of in-
novation and worldwide growth. 
24 It should be noted that a lower τN’s direct impact is to increase Northern labor demand by lowering the mark-up 
price charged by Northern producers in the North. However, this effect is exactly nullified by the reduction in cN 
which is triggered by the lower τN, see equations (18) and (25). A lower τS also exerts competing effects on North-
ern labor demand by increasing cN and decreasing cS, see equations (25) and (26). These two effects exactly cancel 
out as well. Hence, tariff changes affect u
* only via their impact on ι
*. 
25 In Appendix R.1, we check the robustness of our results by endogenizing the Southern imitation rate. We find that 
this leads to a more differentiated view on the growth and employment effects of globalization. While the effects 
of changing import tariffs on innovation and growth are unaffected from endogenizing the Southern imitation rate, 
the effects of an increased presence of the South on the world trade markets are reversed.  
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Proposition 1: Starting from a unique steady-state equilibrium with an interior solution and 
sufficiently low tariff rates, we find that the following changes lead to faster Northern innova-
tion and worldwide growth and lower Northern unemployment: 
i.)  an increase in the relative size of the South ηS; 
ii.)  an increase in the Northern import tariff rate τN; 
iii.)  a decrease in the Southern import tariff rate τS; 
iv.)  a decrease in the Southern imitation rate μ; 
v.)  a decrease in the labor union’s bargaining power α or the minimum wage rate w
min; 
vi.)  a decrease in the liquidation costs B; 
vii.) an increase in the R&D subsidy rate σι. 
As we show in Appendix B, when the competitive wage rate w
comp, given in (B.1), is used instead of 
wL to derive the FEIN condition (29), then tariffs would not matter anymore for the steady-state innova-
tion rate ι
*, hence the “tariff-neutrality” result of our companion paper Grieben and Şener (2009) would be 
reestablished. 
To explain why tariffs do matter under wage bargaining, we note that the bargained wage rate wL giv-
en in (24) contains a rigid component w
min > 0 which drives a wedge between tariff effects on discounted 
R&D benefits and those on R&D costs. Consider for example Northern trade liberalization. A decrease in 
τN reduces the discounted profits of a Northern quality leader from domestic sales by more than it reduces 
the marginal R&D-cost component wL, simply because the minimum-wage component of wL is insensitive 
to tariff changes. Conversely, a decrease in τS increases the discounted profits of a Northern quality leader 
from foreign sales by more than it increases the marginal R&D-cost component wL. The consequences of 
these tariff effects for mercantilist attitudes of the North are analyzed in detail in section 2.11 below. 
Unemployment benefits can play a role similar to minimum wages in our context. Nickell (2003, p. 
19, Table 4) provides evidence of a clear upward trend of unemployment benefit replacement ratios within 
the period 1960 – 1999 in many OECD countries. If the expected per-period income E[wL] ≡ (1−u)wL + 
ubwL is considered by the labor union as the reference wage income in the wage bargaining problem (21) 
instead of w
min, with b ∈ ]0,1[ denoting an unemployment benefit parameter, then the resulting steady-
state solutions for the bargained wage rate  ˆL w  and the innovation rate  ˆ ι  would be those given in (24) and 
(29) with w
min = 0 imposed, respectively. Hence, tariff neutrality would apply again. However, if we as-
sume instead that the per-period unemployment benefit is independent of the bargained wage rate (such 
that E’[wL] ≡ (1−u)wL + ub is taken as reference value in (21) instead of w
min), then the resulting steady-
state solutions for the bargained wage rate wL’ and the innovation rate ι’ would be qualitatively identical to  
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those in our actual framework, only with w
min being replaced by b in (24) and (29), respectively. In that 
case, b would take over the role of w
min in terms of driving a wedge between the effects of any changes in 
tariff rates τN and τS on discounted R&D benefits, and their effects on R&D costs. Hence, for tariff neu-
trality to break down, the reference wage income must contain at least one term that is independent of the 
bargained wage rate itself, may it be w
min or b. Actually, for breaking the tariff-neutrality result it would be 
sufficient to have only a fraction of w
min or b being independent of wL, e.g. w
min ≡ βwL + (1 − β)m, with β 
∈ ]0,1[ and m > 0 being exogenous. We summarize these findings in 
Proposition 2: Tariff changes can only have an impact on Northern steady-state innovation 
and unemployment rates as described in Proposition 1 if the reference wage considered by 
the labor union in the bargaining problem (21) contains an element (like a minimum wage 
rate w
min or a fixed unemployment benefit b) that is independent of the bargained wage rate 
itself. 
2.11  Steady-State Welfare Analysis 
As we show in Appendix R.3 (available upon request), Northern per-capita steady-state welfare can be 
expressed as a function 
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log 1
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, (31)   
which consists of static and dynamic components. The dynamic welfare component is ιlogλ. In the con-
tinuum of industries, quality improvements arrive at a rate of ι, and each improvement raises the con-
sumer’s utility by logλ. The static welfare component is the logarithm of purchased goods summed over 
industries. In a fraction 1 − nN of industries, the Northern consumer faces a price of 
N
S p = 1+τN and pur-
chases 
N
NS cp  units. In the remaining fraction nN of the industries, she faces a price of 
N
N p  = λ(1+τN) > 
N
S p  and buys 
N
NN cp  units. 
Unilateral trade liberalization by the North has competing welfare effects on the components of (31). 
First, a decrease in τN reduces the frequency of quality improvements ι and generates a dynamic welfare 
loss. Second, the lower ι decreases cN as seen in equation (25), causing a static welfare loss. Finally, the 
lower ι raises 1 − nN and thus reduces the consumers’ exposure to relatively high-priced Northern prod-
ucts, causing a static welfare gain. We note that a lower τN has no direct effect on quantities consumed 
N
NN cp  and 
N
NS cp  since a decline in τN decreases cN and the relevant product price proportionally.  
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There is no terms-of-trade effect of a lower τN since the Northern net-of-tariff import price 
N
S p /(1+τN) = 1 
does not change. 
Unilateral trade liberalization by the South also exerts competing effects, mostly working in the op-
posite direction. First, a decrease in τS increases ι and generates a dynamic welfare gain. Second, the high-
er ι raises cN as seen in equation (25), causing a static welfare gain. Third, the higher ι reduces 1 − nN, 
causing a static welfare loss. Finally, a lower τS increases both 
N
NN cp  and 
N
NS cp  by increasing cN 
without affecting Northern product prices. This causes a static welfare gain. The increase in cN is triggered 
by a Northern terms-of-trade improvement due to the rise in the Northern net-of-tariff export price 
λ/(1+τS). 
Using (16) to substitute for nN, 
N
S p = 1+τN, 
N
N p = λ(1+τN), and (25) to substitute for cN in (31) gives, 
after rearranging terms, 
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is sufficient for (33) to yield a corner solution that implies to choose the highest feasible τN = 
max
N τ  that is 
consistent with an interior steady-state equilibrium.
26 Our numerical simulation below shows that condi-
tion (34) is indeed fulfilled for a wide range of plausible parameter values.
27 This establishes that the 
Northern government favors protectionism to maximize its steady-state welfare as captured by (32). 
                                                 
26 According to our assumption of section 2.3, τN < wL − 1 should set the upper bound for τN. However, since the 
steady-state innovation rate ι
* is increasing in τN, and the steady-state unemployment rate u
* is decreasing in ι
*, the 
effective upper bound 
max
N τ  for τN is where it has increased ι
* to the level ι
max that implies u
* = 0 in (27). For the 
benchmark parameters of our simulation below, this latter restriction is the more binding one. 
27 Note that since we do not directly optimize over ι (which would give the social-planner solution), we study here a 
constrained optimum where the market allocation mechanism for the various flows of labor is allowed for (i.e.,  
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The Northern government cannot directly choose τS; however, during trade negotiations it can push 
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, (35) 
for which (34) is again a sufficient condition. This shows that the North favors the lowest feasible τS = 
min
S τ  that is consistent with an interior steady-state equilibrium.
28 This establishes the second part of 
North’s “mercantilist” behavior. Contrary to (33), there is a static welfare gain that is independent of a 
change in the innovation rate: the last term in (35) captures the positive terms-of-trade effect from increas-
ing the Northern net-of-tariff export price λ/(1+τS). 
Note the crucial role of the Northern minimum wage rate for our results: since tariff rates affect the 
steady-state innovation rate only for w
min > 0, the Northern representative consumer would be indifferent 
in terms of steady-state utility with respect to τN according to (33), but would still prefer τS = 
min
S τ  accord-
ing to (35), if w
min = 0 instead. Hence, besides retarding growth and causing unemployment by itself, mini-
mum wages (as well as unemployment benefits unrelated to wL, as argued before) have the additional 
downside that they promote the kind of mercantilist behavior that we regularly observe at WTO trade 
rounds, and that makes trade agreements so difficult to achieve in practice. 
Similarly, Southern per-capita steady-state welfare can be expressed as 
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where we use (16) to substitute for nN, 
S
S p  = 1, 
S
N p  = λ, and (26) to substitute for cS. Obviously, (36) does 
not directly depend on τN but is unambiguously increasing in ι, hence Southern per-capita steady-state 
welfare is also maximized for τN = 
max
N τ , where again terms-of-trade considerations do not play a role. A 
higher τN generates effects similar to those observed for FN. First, it increases ι, a dynamic welfare gain. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(29) is taken to substitute for ι in (34) to check for the corner solution). Since ι is increasing in τN, the solution to 
(32) amounts to maximizing the rate of innovation in the decentralized economy. 
28 Since ι
* is decreasing in τS, and u
* is decreasing in ι
*, the effective lower bound 
min
S τ  for τS is where it has in-
creased ι
* to the level ι
max that implies u
* = 0 in (27). For the benchmark parameters of our simulation below, we 
find that 
min
S τ > 0 holds.  
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The higher ι increases cS as seen in equation (26), a static welfare gain. Finally, the higher ι raises nN, a 
static welfare loss. Maximizing (36) with respect to τS yields a long expression of ambiguous sign.
29 Our 
numerical analysis reveals, however, that among the feasible set of τS that is consistent with ι
* > 0 and 1 > 
u 
*
 ≥ 0, choosing τS = 
min
S τ  maximizes Southern steady-state welfare for reasonable parameter values.
30 
From this it follows that when starting from τS > 
min
S τ , a steady-state welfare-maximizing Southern gov-
ernment wants to unilaterally liberalize trade in order to benefit from the induced growth push in the 
North, which more than outweighs the resulting negative terms-of-trade effect. 
Overall, terms-of-trade effects play a minor role in determining the net welfare impact of tariff 
changes for either country, compared to the dynamic effects triggered by a change in the innovation rate: 
first, for both countries, there is no terms-of-trade effect of a lower τN at all. Second, for the North, the 
positive terms-of-trade effect of a lower τS works into the same direction as the positive dynamic welfare 
effect, and, as obvious from (35), is not even needed to ensure ∂FN/∂τS < 0, provided that condition (34) is 
fulfilled. Third, for the South, the negative terms-of-trade effect of a lower τS is dominated by the positive 
welfare effects that follow from a higher Northern innovation rate. 
In the following numerical analysis we also show that in a cooperative equilibrium aimed at maxi-
mizing global welfare, both countries would agree to choose τN = 
max
N τ  and τS = 
min
S τ . Hence we can es-
tablish 
Proposition 3: The maximum Northern tariff rate 
max
N τ  and the minimum Southern tariff rate 
min
S τ  that are consistent with an interior steady-state equilibrium maximize both Northern 
and Southern steady-state welfare per capita individually, as well as population-weighted 
steady-state world welfare. 
                                                 
29 A decrease in τS has two effects on Southern welfare: first, it directly reduces cS (negative terms-of-trade effect 
from increasing the Southern net-of-tariff import price λ/(1+τS)) which implies a static welfare loss. Second, it 
raises ι which, besides causing the usual dynamic welfare gain, triggers two further static welfare effects: a welfare 
gain by indirectly raising cS, and a welfare loss by increasing the share nN of relatively high-priced Northern prod-
ucts in the Southern consumption basket. 
30  This is shown in the Mathematica
© Appendix to this paper, which is available on the authors’ websites 
(http://cms.uni-konstanz.de/wiwi/grieben/ and http://minerva.union.edu/senerm/).  
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2.12  Numerical Simulation of the Steady-State Equilibrium 
The purpose of deriving our steady-state equilibrium also numerically is fourfold: first, we demonstrate 
that for reasonable parameter values that are consistent with available empirical evidence, a steady-state 
equilibrium that fulfills all imposed restrictions indeed exists. Second, we verify that condition (34) is 
clearly satisfied in this equilibrium, thereby supporting our claims on welfare-maximizing tariff choices 
from the previous section. Third, we demonstrate that not only from a Northern perspective, but also in a 
cooperative equilibrium aimed at maximizing a population-weighted per-capita world welfare, choosing 
the highest feasible τN =
max
N τ and the lowest feasible τS = 
min
S τ  is optimal. Fourth, we provide a marginal 
welfare analysis to show that both Northern and Southern per-capita welfare gains from raising τN and 
reducing τS are increasing in the level of Northern labor market rigidities, as measured by the levels of B, 
α and w
min. 
The choice of our benchmark parameter values as shown in Table 1 below is justified as follows: The 
size of innovations, λ = 1.25, measures the gross mark up (the ratio of the price to the marginal cost) en-
joyed by innovators and is estimated as ranging between 1.05 and 1.4 (see Basu 1996 and Norrbin 1993). 
The subjective discount rate ρ is set at 0.07 to reflect a real interest rate of 7 percent, consistent with the 
average real return on the US stock market over the past century as calculated by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985). The world population growth rate n = 0.012 is calculated as the annual rate of world population 
growth of middle-income (2008 GNI per capita between $976 and $11,905) and high-income (2008 GNI 
per capita $11,906 or more) countries between 1990 and 2008, as defined by the World Bank (2009). The 
ratio of Southern to Northern population ηS = NS/NN  is set at 3.93, which is calculated as the ratio of the 
working age population in middle-income countries to that in high-income countries, again following the 
World Bank (2009). The choice of the innovation subsidy rate σι at 30% follows the estimate for the ef-
fective US R&D subsidy rate 1991 reported in Impullitti (2009). The remaining parameters (Aι, sN, α, w
min, 
μ, τN, τS, and B) are chosen with the objective in mind to generate reasonable values for endogenous vari-
ables, in particular to generate a growth rate g =ιlogλ between 0.5% (following Denison 1985) and 2% 
(the average U.S. GDP per capita growth rate from 1950 to 1994 reported in Jones, 2005). The proportion 
of specialized labor sN is set at 0.002 to generate a wage differential wH/wL that is significantly greater than 
1 since it is reasonable to assume that specialized lobbyists are in low supply and earn more than the gen-
eral-purpose workers. Furthermore, our parameter choices ensure to get a reasonable unemployment rate 
below 20%, a reasonable industry distribution between the North and the South (i.e. without any region 
claiming more than 90% of the industries), and a reasonable union wage premium over the corresponding  
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reference wage, (wL − w
min)/w
min in our model, around 10% (estimates for this measure range from 6% for 
West Germany to 18 percent in US, see Blanchflower and Freeman 1992). 
Table 1: Numerical steady-state equilibrium and marginal welfare analysis 
Benchmark parameters: λ = 1.25, ρ = 0.07, n = 0.012, NN = 1, NS = 3.93, α = 0.5, sN = 0.002, Aι = 1, σι = 0.3, w
min 
= 1.05, μ = 0.2633, τN = τS = 0.01, B = 0.04 
Endogenous variables  Benchmark 
solution 




α =  
0.502 
w
min =  
1.051 
Innovation rate ι  0.07132 0.07288    0.06820  0.06731  0.06613 
Northern industry share nN  0.21313 0.21678    0.20572  0.20359  0.20075 
Bargained wage rate wL  1.14644 1.14666    1.14635  1.14671  1.14679 
Relative specialized wage wH/wL  1.85135 1.93314    1.69941  1.64906  1.59201 
Union wage premium (wL − w
min)/w
min
  0.09185 0.09206    0.09176  0.09210  0.09114 
Unemployment rate u  0.07510 0.05494    0.11548  0.12698  0.14218 
Northern per-capita consumption 
expenditure cN 
1.06672 1.08996    1.01998  1.00667  0.98907 
Southern per-capita consumption 
expenditure cS
  1.00211 1.00204    1.00204  1.00202  1.00199 
Share of R&D in total workforce 
sR&D ≡ Aιι 
0.07132 0.07288    0.06820  0.06731  0.06613 
Share of manufacturing in total workforce 
sM ≡ 1 − sN − u − sR&D 
0.85158 0.87019    0.81432  0.80371  0.78969 
Utility growth rate g = ιlogλ  0.01591 0.01626    0.01522  0.01502  0.01476 
Northern per-capita welfare FN  3.34894 3.72316    2.59031  2.36896  2.07265 
Southern per-capita welfare FS  2.59851 2.65685    2.47898  2.44501  2.40017 
Northern welfare elasticity dlogFN/dlogτN  0.83831 0.71321    1.05918  1.15284  1.31712 
Northern welfare elasticity dlogFN/dlogτS  −3.07740  −2.56307   −4.06548  −4.48322  −5.21274 
Southern welfare elasticity dlogFS/dlogτS  −0.62617  −0.57779   −0.64414  −0.65090  −0.66392 
Notes: Here we provide the main results of our Mathematica
© Appendix, which is available from the authors’ 
websites. We analyze the variation of only one labor market parameter at a time. The conditions (30), (A.6), 
(A.7), 1+τS < λ/wL and 1+τN < wL for the existence of a unique interior steady-state equilibrium are fulfilled 
throughout, as is also condition (34) for corner solutions in the welfare maximization problems (33) and (35). 
For the benchmark parameters, it results ι
comp = 0.07712, w
comp = 1.14576, w
max = 1.24288, and the maximum 
feasible innovation rate consistent with u ≥ 0 is ι
max = 0.07712. In general, the benchmark parameters and out-
comes are in line with the recent related theoretical growth literature that employ numerical simulations, e.g. Di-
nopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), Jones (2002), Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002), Sayek and Şener (2006), Şe-
ner (2006, 2008), Segerstrom (2007), and Impullitti (2009). 
For a wide range of parameters around the benchmark outcome in the first column, condition (34) is 
clearly fulfilled, hence Northern per-capita welfare is maximized by choosing τN = 
max
N τ  and τS = 
min
S τ . 
Furthermore, we derived the optimal tariff structure when the aim is to maximize cooperatively a popula-
tion-weighted world welfare per capita. Consistent with the findings for each individual country, the opti-
mal cooperative solution is again to choose τN = 
max
N τ  and τS = 
min




Given the reciprocity principle in actual WTO trade negotiations, such a cooperative outcome will 
not be feasible in practice. The second column in Table 1 therefore shows the effects of a simultaneous 
and equi-proportionate cut in both tariff rates. While more rigid Northern labor market institutions ana-
lyzed in the other columns force both Northern manufacturing and R&D workers into unemployment 
(which reduces ι, cN, g, FN, and FS), bilateral trade liberalization reallocates unemployed workers into both 
Northern manufacturing and R&D employment, which raises ι, cN, g, FN, and FS. Hence for our empiri-
cally plausible set of benchmark parameters, symmetric bilateral trade liberalization with equi-propor-
tionate tariff cuts at the margin is clearly preferable to the status quo. 
The Northern welfare elasticity with respect to τN, dlogFN/dlogτN = (dFN/FN)/(dτN/τN), equals 0.8383 
in the benchmark case, which implies that for B = 0.04, a 10% increase in τN (from 0.01 to 0.011) would 
raise Northern per-capita steady-state welfare by 8.38%. As the marginal welfare analysis in Table 1 
shows, the Northern welfare elasticities with respect to both τN and τS are substantially increasing in the 
levels of Northern labor market rigidities B, α, and w
min. Moreover, higher Northern rigidities promote 
 
Figure 2: Cooperative maximization of population-weighted world welfare per capita 
Parameters: λ = 1.25, ρ = 0.07, n = 0.012, NN = 1, NS = 3.93, α = 0.5, sN = 0.002, Aι = 1, σι = 0.3, w
min = 1.05, 
μ = 0.2633, B = 0.04. The population-weighted per-capita world welfare is F ≡ [1/(1+ηS)]FN + [ηS/(1+ηS)]FS. 
Calculations are from the Mathematica






Southern trade liberalization, since the Southern welfare elasticity with respect to τS, dlogFS/dlogτS, is also 
increasing in B, α, and w
min (all these elasticity results hold for a wider range of rigidities as is shown in 
the Mathematica
© Appendix). Hence we can establish 
Proposition 4: Starting from a unique steady-state equilibrium with an interior solution and 
sufficiently low tariff rates, the Northern steady-state per-capita welfare gains of Northern 
protectionism (τN ↑) and both the Northern and Southern steady-state per-capita welfare 
gains from Southern trade liberalization (τS ↓) are increasing in the level of Northern labor 
market rigidities B, α, and w
min. 
In other words, Northern mercantilist behavior is more pronounced when the Northern labor market is 
more rigid. We finally note another advantage of bilateral trade liberalization: after the simultaneous de-
crease in tariffs, Northern incentives for protectionism, as measured by dlogFN/dlogτN, decline. 
3  Comparison with Related Literature 
3.1  Explaining Mercantilism 
Krugman (1997) characterizes the GATT negotiations as reflecting mercantilist behavior that cannot be 
justified by any economic reasoning. He claims that, when neglecting the optimal-tariff argument that has 
little relevance in reality, “The economist’s case for free trade is essentially a unilateral case: a country 
serves its own interests by pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do” (p. 113). Our 
analysis casts doubt on the validity of Krugman’s claim by considering the effects of labor market rigidi-
ties.
31 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999), by contrast, defend the principle of reciprocity that is typically applied in 
GATT or WTO trade rounds as leading to welfare improvements for the economies of all negotiating gov-
ernments. This is because “[…] a unilateral liberalization effort is unappealing […] as a consequence of 
the associated deterioration in the terms of trade”, while “a negotiated mutual reduction in tariffs that 
conforms to the principle of reciprocity results in a higher trade volume without a terms-of-trade loss for 
either government” (p. 226).
32 
                                                 
31 Labor market imperfections are actually not a necessary condition to counter Krugman’s claim: in our companion 
paper Grieben and Şener (2009) we show that even with perfectly flexible labor markets, unilateral Southern trade 
liberalization reduces Northern innovative activity and the worldwide steady-state growth rate in an asymmetric 
setting where product-cycle and interindustry trade coexist. 
32 In Appendix R.4 (which is available upon request) we demonstrate that the total trade volume is increasing in ι,  
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Observe that terms-of-trade effects (only for changes in τS) and trade-volume effects (of ambiguous 
sign) are embodied but largely irrelevant in our welfare analysis in section 2.11. Instead, dynamic effects 
that work through changes in the innovation rate ι are driving the welfare results. These dynamic welfare 
effects are completely outside the scope of Bagwell and Staiger (1999). 
Ethier (2004, 2007) offers a critique on Bagwell and Staiger’s “Received Theory” of explaining the 
reciprocity principle in trade negotiations solely by focusing on terms-of-trade externalities. Ethier (2007) 
argues that the “Received Theory” is dramatically inconsistent with empirical evidence of actual multilat-
eral trade agreements: “[…] For over four decades, successive GATT rounds have produced trade agree-
ments that do not prevent terms-of-trade manipulation while trade theorists have produced theories of 
trade agreements in which such prevention is the sole object” (p. 606). Ethier (2007, section 8) proposes a 
political-economy theory that is based on the protection-for-sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
of trade agreements, where terms-of-trade issues are completely out of the picture. Only political-economy 
considerations remain to bring theory in line with empirical evidence again, namely to explain that, first, 
export taxes are not observed although trade negotiations would allow to use them, and second, that we 
observe countervailing-duty laws being implemented. However, Ethier (2007, p. 621) also challenges the 
existing empirical evidence for the protection-for-sale model. Our paper offers an alternative explanation 
for the apparent mercantilism in trade negotiations that does also not rely on terms-of-trade effects but 
instead emphasizes the growth-promoting effects of Northern tariffs when there are union wage bargain-
ing and a minimum wage rate in the North. Moreover, as argued earlier, in the framework of this paper, 
the Northern government has no incentive to set export taxes but a strong incentive to react by means of 
countervailing-duty laws to any Southern export subsidies. All this is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence emphasized by Ethier (2004, 2007). 
3.2  Interactions Between Trade and Labor Market Policies 
Our model captures the substitutability between Northern labor market and trade policies. For example, in 
Northern countries with rigid labor markets, there may be pressure to use protectionism (increase in τN) to 
unwind the negative welfare effects of higher minimum wages or vice versa. This is in line with the theo-
retical findings of Costinot (2009) who analyzes a small open economy with search frictions, where a 
welfare-maximizing government chooses optimal trade taxes across industries. He concludes that “In a 
                                                                                                                                                              
whereas for a given level of ι it moves in an ambiguous direction with changes in τS and remains neutral to 
changes in τN. We show that unilateral Northern trade liberalization unambiguously reduces the total trade volume 
while unilateral Southern trade liberalization has an ambiguous effect on it, and thus bilateral trade liberalization 
by equal proportions, i.e. dτN = dτS = dτ < 0, has also an ambiguous net effect on the total trade volume.  
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cross-section of industries, parameters which are positively correlated with unemployment – workers’ 
bargaining power […] – should also be positively correlated with trade taxes” (p. 1013). This is also con-
firmed by empirical evidence of Matschke and Sherlund (2006) who find a positive correlation between 
unionization rates and trade taxes across industries. Our model shows that these results also apply for the 
aggregate Northern economy in a two-country North-South framework. 
3.3  Growth Impact of Stronger Labor Unions 
The negative growth impact of stronger labor unions in our model contrasts sharply with the findings of 
Palokangas (1996) and Lingens (2003). In a first-generation endogenous growth setting which still fea-
tures the counterfactual scale effect, they distinguish between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and 
innovative R&D is only done by the former. Only the low-skilled wage rate is bargained above the com-
petitive level. Competition on product markets is such that if the labor union is able to bargain a higher 
low-skilled wage rate, this increase in production costs is passed on to consumer prices. This reduces con-
sumption demand and hence necessarily reduces unskilled employment. Given the additional assumption 
that high-skilled and low-skilled workers are weakly substitutable (i.e., complements) in manufacturing, 
this reduces the productivity of high-skilled workers in manufacturing, decreases their competitive wage 
rate, and hence reduces marginal R&D costs. Consequently, some high-skilled workers are reallocated 
towards R&D which finally raises economic growth. 
Our paper differs in all these respects. We assume homogenous labor for production and R&D activi-
ties (hence the degree of substitutability is not an issue) and derive a unique bargained wage rate for those 
workers. Moreover, product prices are pinned down in terms of the Southern wage rate. Under the Nash 
equilibrium of the Bertrand pricing game, Northern firms engage in limit pricing and charge a mark up 
over the marginal cost of the Southern follower firms. In essence, our modeling captures the relevance of 
the South in determining manufactured goods prices by explicitly incorporating the threat of competition 
coming from the South. This renders Northern product prices independent of the Northern bargained wage 
rate and thereby mutes the direct negative employment effect of a stronger union through product prices. 
Instead, our model offers an indirect negative employment effect that works through a reduction of North-
ern innovation activity, which reduces demand for both R&D and manufacturing labor, as a lower innova-
tion rate reduces the proportion of Northern manufacturing industries in the global economy. Finally, we 
derive our results in a fully-endogenous growth model without scale effects taking seriously the Jones 
(1995a, b) critique.  
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4  Conclusions 
We have analyzed the long-run economic growth and welfare consequences of various globalization 
forces in a scale-free North-South endogenous growth model with union wage bargaining in the North. 
We find that Southern unilateral trade liberalization raises Northern firms’ profits by more than it in-
creases the bargained wage rate. This raises the Northern innovation rate and implies a permanent increase 
in product quality growth for both countries. In steady-state welfare simulations, we find that the dynamic 
gains triggered by faster Northern innovation play a dominant role and determine the net change in wel-
fare in the presence of other static welfare effects. Consequently, the higher Northern innovation rate 
boosts the steady-state welfare of both countries. By contrast, Northern unilateral trade liberalization re-
duces Northern firms’ profits by more than it reduces the bargained wage rate. This reduces the innovation 
rate and thus the steady-state welfare levels for both countries, while raising Northern unemployment. 
Thus, our North-South model with an asymmetric labor market structure suggests that at the WTO meet-
ings, Northern countries with unionized labor markets would optimally pursue mercantilist behavior whe-
reas Southern countries with flexible labor markets would optimally pursue trade liberalization. We reach 
these results without relying on terms-of-trade arguments, which is in line with Ethier’s (2004, 2007) cri-
tique of the “Received Theory” of trade negotiations as exemplified by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). 
Northern labor market rigidities are shown to be harmful on two grounds. First, a stronger labor un-
ion, a higher minimum wage and higher shutting-down costs for Northern firms have direct adverse ef-
fects by reducing worldwide growth and welfare, and increasing Northern unemployment. Second, the 
Northern incentives for protectionism (as measured by the Northern welfare elasticity with respect to 
changes in the Northern import tariff) are increasing in the level of Northern labor market rigidities. This 
is an obstacle for reaching a trade agreement at WTO negotiations where the reciprocity principle applies. 
Since we demonstrate numerically that bilateral trade liberalization at the margin raises worldwide growth 
and welfare and hence is clearly preferable to the status quo, Northern labor market rigidities are also indi-
rectly harmful by handicapping welfare-increasing bilateral trade agreements at the margin. We are keen 
to point out that our findings do not advocate protectionism by advanced countries with labor market ri-
gidities. If a normative conclusion is to be drawn from this paper, it should rather be to reduce labor mar-
ket rigidities. 
Further related research can complement our analysis on two grounds. First, from a theoretical per-
spective, one can incorporate FDI and outsourcing into the model and investigate the effects of globaliza-
tion that materialize through these channels. Second, from an empirical perspective, one can test our result 
of an inverse relationship between labor market flexibility and protectionist attitudes. This requires finding  
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a reasonable proxy for the protectionist attitude of governments. Kee et al. (2009)’s trade restrictiveness 
indicators could provide such measures. Such an empirical study can also complement Dutt et al. (2009), 
who find a positive relationship between protection and unemployment using a model that focuses on the 
static effects of trade liberalization in a standard Ricardian framework with frictional labor markets. 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Comparative Statics
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The numerator of (A.2) is positive, and the second term in the denominator converges to zero when tariffs 
go to zero. Therefore, ∂ι
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min < 0 follows for sufficiently low tariff rates if the first term in the denomi-
nator of (A.2) is negative. Using (A.1) and τN = τS = 0 in A, this condition can be written as 
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For τN = τS = 0, (29) can be solved explicitly for 
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and all other comparative-static results of (29) are straightforward from this.
33 Note that for ι
* > 0, both 
numerator and denominator of (A.5) must be positive.
34 They cannot be both negative since this would 
imply 
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which is a contradiction to (30). Hence, condition (30) is also required under free trade to ensure ι
* > 0. 



















,   (A.6) 
where the LHS of (A.6) is the discounted R&D benefit for τN = τS = 0 and ι → 0 from the FEIN condition 
(29). This ensures a positive innovation rate under the actual discount rate ρ + (1+B)(2ι + μ) − n for R&D 
                                                 
33 The steady-state innovation rate ι
* also depends negatively on the interest (households’ time preference) rate ρ and 
the unit resource requirement for R&D  ( ) N A as n ιι δ γ ≡ ; it depends positively on the population growth rate n 
and the R&D subsidy rate σι, while the net impact of a change in λ on ι
* is ambiguous. 
34 Since Aι → ∞ for n → 0, dividing both numerator and denominator of (A.5) by Aι and then setting n = 0 shows 
immediately that a positive steady-state innovation rate is not defined for zero population growth. In our model, 
RPAs lead to accumulation of R&D difficulty stock over time. Thus, supporting a constant and positive innovation 
rate requires expanding resources for R&D, which in turn requires positive population growth. However, if we in-
troduce a constant depreciation rate σ > 0 for R&D difficulty, a positive steady-state innovation rate would no 
longer require positive population growth n > 0. In this case, the equation of motion for R&D difficulty will be 
N DnX D δ σ =−    instead of (8). With n = 0, setting  0 D =    would imply  ( ) NN Ds N δ σγ = , a constant R&D diffi-
culty and positive steady-state growth. This result is in line with Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007), where RPAs 
are instead modeled as a flow variable. However, it contrasts with the general class of semi-endogenous growth 
models discussed in Jones (2005, p. 1073), where R&D difficulty is linked exogenously to innovation and growth 
comes to a halt with zero population growth.  
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.   (A.7) 
Hence for existence and uniqueness of our steady-state equilibrium, we need (30), (A.6) and (A.7) to be 
fulfilled. 
Appendix B: Steady-State Equilibrium with Competitive Wage Rate 
We can derive the competitive wage rate as a function solely in ι, that is, the level of wL that would prevail 
if w
min < w
comp and if there were no Northern wage bargaining. From (11), it is wL = vN/[(1−σι)aιD]. Using 
(15) together with r = ρ and  NN vv   = n to substitute for vN, (9) and (19) to substitute for D, (17) to substi-
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max is given as before in (24). If the competitive wage rate applies, the Northern labor markets 
must clear, so that the steady-state innovation rate corresponding to that situation can be derived from 
setting u












.   (B.2) 
Note that if follows from (B.2) that our model turns into a semi-endogenous growth framework for com-
petitive wage setting: ι
comp cannot be influenced by any public policies as long as Southern imitation re-
mains exogenous. The interpretation of ι
comp is straightforward: it increases for a lower share sN of special-
ized workers engaged in rent protection, a lower share of general-purpose workers employed in manufac-
turing (which is positively related to ηS/(λμ)), and a lower effective unit resource requirement for R&D Aι. 
Note in particular that as in the baseline setting of Grieben and Şener (2009), tariffs are neutral for the 
steady-state innovation rate under competitive wage determination. Any profit-increasing tariff changes 
(i.e. an increase in τN that raises the profits from Northern domestic sales, or a decrease in τS that raises the  
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profits from Northern exports) are mitigated by a corresponding increase in w
comp, and the resulting gen-
eral-equilibrium effects associated with changes in w
comp, cN, and cS completely nullify the initial positive 
tariff stimulus, and similarly for profit-decreasing tariff changes. We note that ρ, n, B, and σι do not affect 
ι
comp
  either. Hence, a similar nullification effect is at work regarding these parameters. 
Finally, it follows from (27) and (B.2) that the equilibrium innovation rate ι
* falls short of the innova-
tion rate under competitive wage setting ι











.   (B.3) 
This is the case whenever wL > w
comp. 
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